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Abstract: 
In this article I discuss and evaluate the selectivity 
problem as a problem put forward by Bermúdez (1997, 
2000) against anti-intentionalist accounts of self-decep-
tion. I argue that the selectivity problem can be raised 
even against intentionalist accounts, which reveals the too 
demanding constraint that the problem puts on the ade-
quacy of a psychological explanation of action. Finally I 
try to accommodate the intuitions that support the co-
gency of the selectivity problem using the resources from 
the framework provided by an anti-intentionalist account 
of self-deception. 
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1. Introduction 
The phenomenon of self-deception has proven 
to be a very controversial philosophical subject 
whose paradigmatic cases are hard to characterize in 
a general manner. However, one can find a fairly 
neutral description of the phenomenon of self-
deception that encompasses varieties of views on the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “self-
deception is the acquisition and maintenance of a 
belief (or, at least, the avowal of that belief) in the 
face of strong evidence to the contrary motivated by 
desires or emotions favoring the acquisition and 
retention of that belief” (Deweese-Boyd 2006).  
Standard examples of self-deception that can be 
found in philosophical literature usually involve a 
person that is under the grip of emotion forming a 
self-deceptive belief about some state of affairs. For 
example, a mother is present at the court where her 
son is being tried for murder. She listens to all the 
evidence that the prosecutor is presenting and de-
spite the persuasiveness of the evidence, which 
would be more than enough for an unbiased ob-
server to convict her son, she stays convinced that 
her son is innocent. Intuitively, in this case we say 
that the mother has a self-deceived belief that her 
son is innocent because she is not responsive to the 
available evidence to the contrary and because the 
formation of her (self-deceptive) belief is caused in 
an irrational manner; it was caused by her attach-
ment to the son and not by the available evidence.    
 
1.1 Intentionalist and anti-intentionalist ac-
counts of self-deception 
There are two general groups of accounts that 
try to explain the phenomenon of self-deception. On 
the one hand, intentionalists think that self-deception 
essentially involves an intention on the part of the 
self-deceiver who actively (intentionally) deceives 
herself (e.g. Bermúdez 2000, Davidson 2004). On 
the other hand, anti-intentionalists think that self-
deception can be explained without invoking the 
concept of intention in forming the self-deceived 
belief (see e.g. Johnston 1988; Lazar 1997, 1999; 
Mele 1998, 2001).   
To illustrate differences between the two ac-
counts let us consider Davidson’s (2004) example: 
 
Carlos has a good reason to believe he will not 
pass the test for a driving license. He has failed the 
test twice before and his instructor has said discour-
aging things to him. On the other hand, he knows the 
examiner personally, and he has faith in his own 
charm. He is aware that the totality of the evidence 
points to failure. […] But the thought of failing the 
test once again is painful to Carlos (in fact the 
thought of failing at anything is particularly galling 
to Carlos). So he has a perfectly natural motive for 
believing he will not fail the test, that is, he has a 
motive for making it the case that he is a person who 
believes he will (probably) pass the test.  (p. 209) 
According to Davidson we should interpret Car-
los’ case as a case in which Carlos goes through a 
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process of practical reasoning that ends up with his 
forming an intention to form a belief that he will 
pass the test. Because of the uneasiness that Carlos 
would feel if he failed his test he forms a desire to 
avoid feeling this uneasiness. Together with the 
belief that this desire can be satisfied by forming a 
belief that he will not fail the test, Carlos intention-
ally leads himself to believing that he will not fail 
the test. This pattern of practical reasoning exhibited 
by Carlos is parallel to the reasoning that a person 
undergoes when intentionally doing something. For 
example, a construction worker wants to make con-
crete: she knows that in order to make concrete she 
must mix water, cement, and sand; therefore, she 
forms an intention to mix water, cement, and sand, 
and consequently she executes her intention into an 
(intentional) action. 
However, intentionalist accounts traditionally 
face at least two problems, the so-called static and 
dynamic paradoxes (see Bermúdez 2000; Mele 
2001).1 These prima facie problems for intentionalist 
accounts gave a boost to anti-intentionalist proposals 
for explaining self-deception (cf. Bermúdez 2000, 
309; Mele 2001; see also Bermúdez 1997). Accord-
ing to anti-intentionalists we do not have to postulate 
the presence of an intention in the mind of the self-
deceiver in order to explain the phenomenon of self-
deception. Anti-intentionalists claim that putative 
unintentional mechanisms of the mind are enough to 
explain garden-variety cases of self-deception. In 
this respect, the main strategy of the anti-
intentionalists is to explain self-deception as a case 
of motivationally biased belief. 
For example, anti-intentionalists would claim 
that Carlos does not intend to deceive himself; 
rather, they would claim that he has a strong desire 
not to fail the test, since that would cause him dire 
pain. Consequently, the desire biases his belief-
forming process and causes him to believe that he is 
not going to fail the test. In the next subsection I will 
present what is currently the most influential anti-
intentionalist account of self-deception and then in 
the following section I will present and discuss the 
objection to this account proposed by Bermúdez 
(1997, 2000) 
 
                                                 
1
 To indicate briefly, the static paradox concerns the fact 
that intentionalists are seemingly committed to a claim 
that a self-deceiver has two contradictory beliefs (belief 
that p causes the belief that not p [see Davidson 2004, 
208]). And the dynamic paradox reflects the seeming 
problem according to which the intentionalist needs to 
ascribe a self-defeating intention to a self-deceiver (i.e. 
the intention to deceive herself). 
1.2 Mele’s anti-intentionalist account 
According to the most influential contemporary 
anti-intentionalist, Alfred Mele (1997, 2001), there 
are four jointly sufficient, though not necessary, 
conditions that explain the acquirement of a belief 
through a process of self-deception:  
1. The belief that p which S acquires is false. 
2. S treats data relevant, or at least seemingly 
relevant, to the truth-value of p in a motivationally 
biased way. 
3. This biased treatment is a non-deviant cause 
of S’s acquiring the belief that p. 
4. The body of data possessed by S at the time 
provides greater warrant for ~p than for p. (50-51) 
The first condition is intuitive; Mele claims that 
“A person is, by definition, deceived in believing 
that p only if p is false” (ibid., 51), and that the same 
holds for self-deception.2  
The second condition concerns the mechanisms 
through which people acquire self-deceived beliefs. 
Mele (ibid., 26-27) names four possible mecha-
nisms. Negative misinterpretation is a phenomenon 
that happens when a person’s desire that p causes 
her to misinterpret that some evidence does not 
count against p when the same evidence would be 
considered to count against p, if it were not for the 
desire that p. In our first example, it could be the 
case that the mother believes that the murder 
weapon with her son’s fingerprints does not count as 
evidence for her son’s being guilty, even though she 
would believe that it counts as evidence were it not 
for the desire that her son be innocent. 
Positive misinterpretation is manifested when a 
person misinterprets some evidence as favoring her 
desired proposition when that evidence, in absence 
of the biasing desire, would easily be recognized as 
counting against the desired proposition. Mele (ibid., 
27) gives an instructive example: Sid is in love with 
Roz, but Roz does not love Sid. However, Sid misin-
terprets her refusal of his affection as evidence that 
she really loves him (and pretends that she is ‘hard 
to get’), and that she wants him to prove his real 
love for her.  
Another psychological process is the selective 
focusing on evidence. The process in question is 
such that the mother’s desire that her son be inno-
cent can lead her to focus her attention on evidence 
that counts in favor of her son being innocent and 
that can lead her to fail to recognize the available 
                                                 
2
 However, not all authors would agree with this claim. 
For example Bermúdez (2000, 310–311, 312) argues that 
even in interpersonal deception the deceiver does not have 
to hold that the deceived belief has to be false, and by 
analogy the same should work for self-deception. 
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evidence that goes against the truth of her desired 
proposition.  
The fourth mechanism that Mele presents is se-
lective evidence-gathering. To illustrate this mecha-
nism we can suppose that the mother is trying to 
guide her own investigation about her son’s case. 
However, while investigating, the mother’s desire 
that her son be innocent biases her into overlooking 
the evidence that goes against her desired proposi-
tion and leads her to find some less obvious and less 
convincing evidence that her son is innocent. 
The third condition is added by Mele to secure 
the exclusion of cases of distorted belief-forming 
processes that are not cases of self-deception. For 
example, a mother may want to believe that her son 
is innocent and that desire can bias her search for 
evidence in favor of her desired belief. However, 
while trying to investigate the crime scene (or some 
scene more available to her) in order to find some 
evidence in her son’s favor, she slips on the wet 
floor and falls on her head. After she wakes up, be-
cause of the trauma, she starts to believe that her son 
is innocent. In this case we can say that her desire to 
believe that her son is innocent caused her to believe 
that he actually is innocent. However, the causal 
chain from the desire that p to the belief that p is 
causally deviant in a way which prevents us from 
saying that this is a case of self-deception. 
The fourth condition is meant to capture the of-
ten present characteristic of self-deception; that is, 
the failure of epistemic rationality. An epistemically 
rational person is someone who forms her beliefs in 
accordance with the best available evidence. How-
ever, a self-deceiver is a person who, despite the 
availability of good evidence to believe ~p, starts to 
believe that p because she has a biasing desire that p 
be true. So, a self-deceiver is epistemically irrational 
because she forms her beliefs on the basis of her 
desires and not on the basis of the available evi-
dence. However, unlike Davidson (2004), Mele does 
not take this condition to be necessary for entering 
into the process of self-deception.3 
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 In a recent article Mele (2012) introduces two amend-
ments to his jointly sufficient conditions for acquiring 
self-deceptive belief. These are: condition 5: “S con-
sciously believes at the time that there is a significant 
chance that ~p”; and condition 6: “S’s acquiring the belief 
that p is a product of “reflective, critical reasoning,” and S 
is wrong in regarding that reasoning as properly directed” 
(12). Condition 5 is meant to accommodate the intuition 
that there is some cognitive tension (conflict) present in 
cases of self-deception. While condition 6 captures the 
intuition that self-deception requires mistaken higher-
order thought about the causes of one’s own cognitive 
activities (see Mele 2012, 10–12). I am mentioning these 
In order to make his account more empirically 
adequate, Mele (1997, 2001) relies on an empirical 
model of everyday hypothesis testing, developed by 
the psychologists Friedrich (1993), and Trope & 
Liberman (1996). The idea behind the FTL model4 is 
succinctly summarized by Bermúdez (see also Mele 
2012): 
People have different acceptance/rejection 
thresholds for hypotheses depending upon the ex-
pected subjective cost to the individual of false ac-
ceptance or false rejection relative to the resources 
required for acquiring and processing information. 
The higher the expected subjective cost of false ac-
ceptance the higher the threshold for acceptance; 
similarly for rejection. Hypotheses which have a 
high acceptance threshold will be more rigorously 
tested and evaluated than those which have a low 
acceptance threshold (Bermúdez 2000, 316). 
In garden-variety cases of self-deception Mele 
proposes that the structure of everyday hypothesis 
testing will enable one to enter into a process of self-
deception. This idea can be illustrated with an ex-
ample. A mother who desires that her son is inno-
cent would experience more painfully the thought 
that her son is guilty than that he is innocent. These 
emotions, and the desire that her son is innocent, 
structure her expected subjective cost of believing a 
hypothesis in a way that makes it easier for her to 
falsely believe that her son is innocent, than to 
falsely believe that her son is not innocent. Because 
of this subjective cost, her acceptance threshold for 
believing that her son is innocent will be much lower 
than the acceptance threshold for believing that her 
son is guilty. According to Mele, the desire that the 
son be innocent and the low threshold associated 
with the desired state of affairs is what explains the 
mother’s acquiring the self-deceived belief that her 
son is innocent. 
 
 
2. Anti-intentionalism and the selectivity 
problem 
Bermúdez (1997, 2000) has put forward a prob-
lem that threatens to undermine anti-intentionalist 
accounts in favor of intentionalist models. In this 
section I will present his objection. Here is how 
Bermúdez formulates the problem: 
Any explanation of a given instance of self-
deception will need to explain why motivational bias 
                                                                               
two amendments in a footnote because they do not play 
any significant role in what follows in the present article. 
4
 FTL stands for Friedrich, Trope and Liberman, psy-
chologists who developed the model of everyday hy-
pothesis testing. 
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occurred in that particular situation. But the desire 
that p should be the case is insufficient to motivate 
cognitive bias in favour of the belief that p. There 
are all sorts of situations in which, however strongly 
we desire it to be the case that p, we are not in any 
way biased in favour of the belief that p. How are 
we to distinguish these from situations in which our 
desires result in motivational bias? I will call this the 
selectivity problem (Bermúdez 2000, 317). 
According to Bermúdez, the conditions enumer-
ated by Mele for having a case of self-deception are 
insufficient because they cannot explain why the 
desire that p be the case in one situation will cause 
us to believe that p is the case, while in another 
situation it will not. Bermúdez (1997, 108) claims 
that Mele illegitimately draws “analogy between 
familiar examples of unintentional cold bias and 
motivationally hot bias.” The difference between 
instances of cold bias and self-deception is that cold 
bias is nonselective, which means that regardless of 
its subject matter it gets activated, while the process 
of self-deceptive belief formation is subject depend-
ent (ibid.).   
Mele (2001, 63-65) tries to answer the selectiv-
ity problem by using the FTL model for hypothesis 
testing in order to explain what makes the difference 
between two situations in which a desire with the 
same content has different effects on the formation 
of the belief. He gives an example of Gordon who is 
a CIA agent that has been accused of treason. 
Gordon’s parents and all of his colleagues want him 
to be innocent and they all have access to the same 
information regarding Gordon’s case. However, 
based on the available evidence, Gordon’s parents 
come to the conclusion that he is innocent, while his 
colleagues, on the basis of the same evidence, con-
clude that he is guilty.  
According to Mele, what explains that the par-
ents and Gordon’s colleagues come to believe dif-
ferent things, despite having the same desire and 
access to the same evidence, is the fact that their 
acceptance/rejection thresholds for the hypothesis 
that Gordon is innocent are different. For Gordon’s 
parents it is less costly to falsely believe that he is 
innocent, than to falsely believe that he is guilty. 
While for his colleagues it is the other way around; 
since their lives depend on the verdict, it is much 
costlier for them to falsely believe that Gordon is 
innocent than to falsely believe that he is guilty. 
Accordingly, the difference in associated costs 
causes parents to have a low acceptance threshold 
for the hypothesis that their son is innocent, while 
his colleagues have high thresholds for the accep-
tance of the same hypothesis. 
 However, Bermúdez (2000, 317–318) asserts 
that the selectivity problem reappears again even if 
we introduce the cost/benefit analysis as Mele does. 
Bermúdez’s claim is that “there are many hypothe-
ses for which my motivational set dictates a low 
acceptance and high rejection threshold and for 
which the evidence available to me is marginal 
enough to make self-deception possible. But I self-
deceivingly come to believe only a small proportion 
of them. Why those and not others?” (2000, 318).  
Bermúdez’s answer is that what is missing and 
what solves the selectivity problem is the intention 
“on the part of the self-deceiver to bring it about that 
he acquires the belief that p” (ibid.). This is why, 
according to Bermúdez, intentionalist accounts (in 
some form) must be right, since they have a ready 
answer to the selectivity problem that anti-
intentionalists supposedly do not have.  
In the next section I will try to show that, if 
genuine, the selectivity problem can also be raised 
against intentionalist accounts. After that I will ex-
amine one possible solution to the selectivity prob-
lem proposed in (Pedrini 2010).  
 
 
3. The selectivity problem for intentionalists 
If the selectivity problem is genuine, then intro-
ducing intentions into the account will not solve the 
problem. As Mele (2001, 65-66) already noticed, 
even if intentions were necessary for accounting for 
an episode of self-deception, intentionalists will 
have a selectivity problem of their own. Let us sup-
pose that what explains the difference between situa-
tions in which agent A with a strong desire that p 
self-deceivingly believes that p and situations in 
which she does not, is the fact that in one situation 
she had an intention to bring it about that she be-
lieves p and in another she had no such intention. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that there are many cases in 
which we intend to do something and fail to accom-
plish it. I can intend to become a basketball player, 
and fail to become one; also, I can intend to raise a 
glass that is on the table and fail to do that, just like I 
can intend to hit the bulls-eye and not manage to do 
that. So, having an intention to bring oneself to be-
lieve something does not seem to be sufficient for 
entering into a process of self-deception since noth-
ing in the nature of intention guarantees that the 
intention will be effective. Hence, the question of 
selectivity of self-deception would arise for inten-
tionalists as well; they seem to be faced with the 
question of what is the difference between situations 
in which agent A has the intention to be self-
deceived and manages to self-deceive herself and 
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situations in which she does not succeed in execut-
ing that intention.  
Moreover, a stronger point can be made against 
the intentionalist who thinks that the selectivity 
problem can be resolved by introducing the relevant 
intention. In his (1997, 108; 2000 317) Bermúdez 
put the following desideratum on the proper expla-
nation of self-deception: “Any explanation of a 
given instance of self-deception will need to explain 
why motivational bias occurred in that particular 
situation.” If we generalize Bermúdez’s proposal, 
we can say that at the most general level, the selec-
tivity problem boils down to the question: why some 
people deceive themselves and others do not?5 From 
this standpoint, even if, for the sake of argument, we 
grant that intentionalist accounts are true, we still 
would not have a proper explanation why in a par-
ticular case an episode of self-deception occurred. 
Namely, Bermúdez supposes that introducing an 
intention to acquire a belief will explain why in this 
particular situation an episode of self-deception oc-
curred. However, an intention by itself cannot ex-
plain an occurrence of self-deception. To rephrase 
Bermúdez (2000): Any explanation of a given in-
stance of self-deception will need to explain why 
intention was formed in that particular situation.  
To see why let us consider a more general ex-
ample of an instance of action explanation. In folk-
psychological explanations of action we usually 
explain why someone did something by invoking the 
reasons for which that person acted. For example, 
we say that Jennifer went to a store because she 
wanted some candy, and that she believed that by 
going to the store she could buy some candy. Since 
we suppose that Jennifer’s action was intentional we 
ascribe to Jennifer an intention to go to the store. 
However, ascribing an intention to Jennifer does not 
explain why she went to the store; the reasons (i.e. 
desires and beliefs) explain why she formed that 
intention and performed that action. A similar point 
can be made in the case of self-deception. Introduc-
ing an intention to self-deceive will not explain why 
in this particular situation an instance of self-
deception occurred. We need to know the reasons 
for which the intention is formed, and, in the folk-
psychological sense, this will include the desire and 
a means-end belief.6  
                                                 
5
 I am very grateful to Patrizia Pedrini for giving me an 
idea how the following case can be used against the inten-
tionalist’s solution of the selectivity problem. 
6
 See Bermúdez (1997, 108) where he writes: “the 
intentionalist holds that the subject must intend to cause 
himself to believe that p by biasing his cognitive 
processes because (a) he desires to believe that p and (b) 
So, in order to explain why in this particular in-
stance self-deception occurred, we need to invoke a 
desire and a belief. But, now, we can ask why in this 
particular situation a desire that p be the case caused 
an intention to believe that p is the case? As Ber-
múdez noted, we have all kinds of desires that, nev-
ertheless how strong, do not cause us to believe that 
p is the case; similarly we can say that we have dif-
ferent strong desires to believe that p be the case (or 
that we believe that p is the case), that nevertheless 
do not cause an intention to believe that p. So, in this 
way we can raise the selectivity problem against the 
intentionalist account. Namely, we can raise the 
question why in this particular situation desire that p 
be the case (or to believe that p) caused an intention 
to believe that p is the case since, according to Ber-
múdez, in all kinds of situations, no matter how 
strongly we desire that p be the case it does not 
cause us to believe that p is the case. 
Someone could argue on behalf of Bermúdez 
that the intentionalist account of self-deception ex-
plains the occurrence of an episode of self-deception 
and solves the selectivity problem as a complex 
whole that includes intentions and reasons for the 
intention. She can say that the selectivity problem 
only indicates the possibility of a situation in which 
we have two persons (we can call them A and B) 
with equally strong desires that p be the case and 
equal thresholds for accepting and rejecting hy-
pothesis, of which only one person self-deceivingly 
starts to believe that p is the case. And the intention-
alist supposes that what explains the difference be-
tween A and B is the formation of the intention to 
believe that p on the part of the individual that self-
deceives (e.g. A).7 
However, this response could only work, as a 
solution of the selectivity problem, if we suppose 
two things (not necessarily as a conjunction) about 
the situation8 in which we have A and B. (i) We can 
suppose that intentions to self-deceive are caused by 
sheer chance by the reasons that precede the inten-
                                                                               
he believes that the best way to achieve this is to bias his 
cognitive processes in the ways that Mele discussed.” 
7
 One could object that the example with two persons is 
not adequate since Bermúdez explicitly writes that the 
“selectivity problem is not a problem of how two people 
in similar situations can acquire different beliefs” (2000, 
317). However the example would work even if we 
suppose that there is one person with an identical 
psychological makeup at different moments in time.  
8
 This situation, by supposition, involves complete 
psychological (functional) identity between A and B in 
moments before A forms an intention to acquire some 
belief. 
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tion formation. Or (ii) we can suppose that intentions 
to self-deceive are an effect of a conscious decision.  
Response (i) does not sound very plausible, 
since we would need to suppose that what precedes 
formation of an intention does not influence in any 
substantive way the intention to form a self-
deceiving belief. This would go against our folk-
psychological conception of ourselves, which in-
clude law-like generalizations that figure in action-
explanations (see e.g. Churchland 1981).  
If we suppose (ii) then we could explain the dif-
ference between A and B in a plausible way, since 
we could say that A (unlike B) deliberated about the 
issue at hand and decided that she will intentionally 
deceive herself into believing that p is the case. As a 
consequence of that decision A could then engage in 
performing the necessary steps to cause herself to 
believe that p. However, response (ii) is not plausi-
ble as an intentionalist account of self-deception 
because it could not encompass and explain garden-
variety cases of self-deception. Namely, it overly 
intellectualizes the core cases of self-deception since 
it supposes that they have the form similar to Pas-
cal’s wager and this is something that even Ber-
múdez (2001, 318) recognizes as not being vindi-
cated by his argument. Furthermore, such overly 
intellectualized cases could even be incorporated in 
anti-intentionalist accounts since they do not sup-
pose that a person can never decide to acquire a be-
lief and then to undertake the necessary steps to 
accomplish that goal. However, the crucial thing that 
divides the two accounts of self-deception is exactly 
the explanation of garden-variety cases of self-
deception (see Mele 1997, 99).  
Hence, it seems that intentionalist accounts do 
not present a proper explanation of garden-variety 
cases of self-deception. Since, if genuine, the selec-
tivity problem can be raised even against them. 
 
 
4. Value-based solution to the selectivity 
problem 
More recently Pedrini (2010) has offered a pos-
sible solution to the selectivity problem by suppos-
ing that what makes the difference between a self-
deceiver and a person who resists self-deception is 
the embodiment of epistemic values that the latter 
exhibits. To embody an epistemic value is to be 
disposed to behave in certain ways. Here is an ex-
ample from ethics:  
[i]f S embodies the value of generosity, to the 
extent that generosity can be attributed to S as one of 
her traits, S is disposed to a wide range of behaviors 
that we define as generous: perhaps she offers her 
friends a dinner to celebrate their birthdays, or she 
will help others in need even if they are strangers, 
etc. (Pedrini 2010, 133.) 
Similarly, Pedrini claims that a person who em-
bodies epistemic values, such as a value of truth, 
epistemic accuracy, completeness and impartiality 
(ibid.) will be disposed to behave in such a way that 
will preclude that person from entering into a state 
of self-deception. Thus, according to this account, a 
person can have a desire that p, a desire that could 
cause her to lower the acceptance threshold for the 
hypothesis that p, but she will not be disposed to 
self-deceive if she really embodies the epistemic 
values protective against self-deception. For exam-
ple, if a mother has a desire that her son is innocent 
and has a low acceptance threshold for this hypothe-
sis, if she embodies the relevant epistemic values, 
which constitute her dispositions to behave in an 
epistemically virtuous way, she will override her 
biasing desire and start to evaluate the evidence in 
order to find out the truth, no matter what are the 
possible costs associated with finding new and pos-
sibly devastating evidence for her son’s case.  
Pedrini’s account is an interesting prima facie 
solution to the selectivity problem. It introduces the 
evaluative element by supposing that what explains 
the selectivity of self-deception is the presence or 
absence of epistemic values to which the agent is 
committed. Moreover, it seems that Pedrini’s ac-
count can improve and amend Mele’s use of the FTL 
model, since now we can explain what, besides de-
sires, determines the rejection/acceptability thresh-
olds for hypotheses. In an epistemically virtuous 
agent, her epistemic values determine the relevant 
threshold, and protect from its being affected and 
modified by desires. So, using Pedrini’s account we 
can explain the difference between agents who de-
ceive themselves and ones who do not by appealing 
to their evaluative structure. 
However, there is an objection that can be 
pressed against this latter account. Pedrini (2010, 
134-135) examines one possible objection. One 
might say that epistemic values cannot be enough to 
secure one from exhibiting an episode of self-
deception because one can be weak-willed and in the 
presence of a desire that p can become akratic and 
unable to employ their best epistemic strategies. 
That is, in that case, a person would, against her best 
epistemic judgment about how to treat the evidence, 
be unable to act in accordance with that judgment, 
and consequently the desire that p would cause her 
to treat available evidence in a motivationally biased 
way. So in this kind of case (epistemic akrasia) em-
bodiment of epistemic virtues apparently would not 
secure one from forming self-deceptive beliefs, and 
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furthermore, would not resolve the selectivity prob-
lem. 
Pedrini tries to show that the case of akrasia is 
not a counterexample to her account because her 
account of embodied values is designed to rule out 
cases of epistemic akrasia9 (Pedrini ibid, 134). She 
explains her idea by introducing the distinction be-
tween “something being judged valuable” and “valu-
ing something” (ibid.). For example, one may say 
that helping others is good, but then never exhibit 
the helping behavior when in a situation where help-
ing behavior is appropriate. For that person we 
would say that she does not really value helping 
others. On the other hand, if someone values some-
thing, then if the right circumstances occur, she will 
be disposed to act in accordance with her judgment. 
According to Pedrini (ibid.), to really value some-
thing is to embody that value and if we really em-
body a value then it seems that we cannot fail to 
exhibit that value when the circumstances are appro-
priate.  
However, the introduction of the distinction be-
tween ‘judging valuable’ and ‘valuing’ does not get 
to the core of the problem of the possibility of epis-
temic akrasia. In order to evaluate the plausibility of 
the latter counterexample (and its supposed rebuttal) 
we need to restrict our attention only to cases of 
‘valuing’, where this attitude can be construed as 
being manifested in a sincere judgment that some-
thing is valuable.10 So what is ‘valuing’? According 
to Pedrini (2010) to value something is to embody 
that value, and to embody a value is to be disposed 
to act in accordance with the corresponding sincere 
value judgment when the circumstances are appro-
priate. Therefore, it seems that what plays a crucial 
role in explaining valuing is the notion of a disposi-
tion, since disposition explains what it means to 
embody a value. The notion of a disposition involves 
all kinds of intricacies that have not yet been phi-
losophically resolved; however there are a few 
commonplaces (platitudes) concerning dispositions 
                                                 
9
 When I use the expression ‘epistemic akrasia’ I intend it 
in the sense in which it is used in theory of action with the 
obvious limitation, since in the epistemic case, the action 
will be concerned with theoretical investigation whose 
final product is a belief (and I do not presuppose that the 
belief formation itself needs to be intentional). 
Accordingly, epistemic akrasia will concern the failure of 
employing epistemic strategies that one judges to be the 
best (see Pedrini 2010, 134–135). 
10
 When I say sincere judgment I mean to include the idea 
that the agent not only believes of herself that her value 
judgment is sincere (where the latter belief could be 
mistaken), but that the value judgment really (actually) 
manifests what she really (actually) values.   
that are relevant for the present article. It is widely 
recognized that dispositions involve some notion of 
conditionality that connects their stimulus and mani-
festation conditions.11 For example, let us take into 
consideration the notion of fragility. Typically, the 
fragility of an object manifests itself in the object’s 
tendency to break under suitable conditions. How-
ever, to ascribe fragility to an object it is not neces-
sary that its typical manifestation always occurs; a 
fragile object will still be fragile even if it never 
manifests that property (e.g. it never breaks). Dispo-
sitional properties will be manifested only if certain 
conditions are satisfied, that is, only if certain ante-
cedent or stimulus conditions are fulfilled (cf. Mum-
ford 1998, 6). Since veridical ascription of disposi-
tions does not require occurrence of typical manifes-
tation, a thing can have a dispositional property that 
is never manifested. For example, an object can be 
fragile, without ever breaking because stimulus con-
ditions for its becoming broken never occur. Also it 
is possible that even if stimulus conditions are pre-
sent the circumstances in which manifestation usu-
ally occurs do not have to obtain because some inter-
fering factors are also present. For example, when 
emerged into the water (stimulus condition), sugar 
will typically dissolve (manifestation of solubility), 
but if the water were already saturated, then sugar’s 
solubility would not be manifested. 
These same features of dispositions when trans-
lated into the talk about judgments and value take 
the following form. For example, a plausible formu-
lation of value judgment internalism, given by Mi-
chael Smith, takes the following form: if a person 
judges that it is right to do A, then if rational, she 
will do A (Smith 1994, 62). According to this view, 
if someone does not behave in accordance with her 
sincere value judgment, it does not mean that she 
does not embody the value expressed by that judg-
ment, it only means that she is exhibiting some kind 
of irrationality (perhaps she is depressed or weak-
willed, etc. (ibid.)); that is, it just means that the 
disposition to act in a way that corresponds to one’s 
sincere value judgment does not get manifested.12 
Now the question can be posed: does the notion of 
an epistemically virtuous agent (or an agent that 
embodies epistemic value) play a role similar to 
stimulus conditions (that encompass the rationality 
                                                 
11
 What kind of conditionality will the notion of a 
disposition involve and whether it will always be a 
counterfactual, is a controversial philosophical issue. For 
a discussion see e.g. (Bird 2007, section 2.2); Mumford 
1998, chapters 3, 4).  
12
 Still in other words, we can say that the disposition gets 
defeated, but not erased. 
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condition) or the role similar to the dispositional 
property itself that manifests certain properties in the 
right stimulus conditions?13 
If we equate the embodiment of epistemic val-
ues with the disposition to exhibit epistemically 
virtuous action then the problem of epistemic akra-
sia lurks back in. Namely, if embodiment of epis-
temic values involves dispositions to act in certain 
ways, then the ascription of the latter disposition(s) 
can be veridical without manifesting its conse-
quence(s) in any particular case. For example, if we 
take the latter line, it can still be the case that a per-
son self-deceives that p is the case even though she 
still has the disposition to behave in an epistemically 
virtuous way. To take the standard philosophical 
platitude, the disposition would be defeated, but not 
erased, because the desire that p be the case is so 
overwhelming in this particular situation that it man-
ages to silence (defeat) the otherwise epistemically 
stabile character. Thus if we take the latter reading 
as something that Pedrini proposes then the case of 
epistemic akrasia becomes a problem for her ac-
count once again. 
Hence, it seems that in order to avoid the former 
consequence we should equate epistemic value em-
bodiment with stimulus conditions or, in Michael 
Smith’s sense, with the rationality condition. If we 
take this line of thought then it seems that we can 
exclude cases of epistemic akrasia. Namely, just like 
in the practical case, where a person who does not 
act in accordance with her sincere practical judg-
ment exhibits a case of practical irrationality, we can 
say that when a person self-deceives she exhibits 
behavior (or thought) that is ipso facto not epistemi-
cally virtuous. 
However, even if plausible to a certain degree, 
the value-based solution of the selectivity problem is 
not without its problems. For example, we can ask 
whether the embodiment of epistemic values come 
in degrees or is an absolute characteristic; and con-
nected to the latter issue, whether we should take the 
embodiment of values to be contextual, so that one 
can fully embody one and the same value in certain 
life circumstances and fail to embody it in another, 
or not.14 If we suppose that embodiment comes in 
                                                 
13
 Of course an epistemically virtuous agent will embody 
a whole set of epistemic values and correspondingly will 
be disposed to exhibit a whole range of subdispositions 
that comprise epistemic virtues (such as evidence 
gathering, evidence evaluation, sound reasoning, etc.). 
14
 For example, a successful scientist may embody all the 
relevant epistemic values in the context of her 
professional work, but be completely unresponsive to 
them when issues concerning her private life become 
salient. Does such a person fully embody relevant 
degrees then it would seem that the problem of akra-
sia could again become salient because there is no 
obvious boundary that would delimit degrees of 
embodiment that would exclude cases of systematic 
akrasia. Prima facie, it seems that we could only be 
certain that full (absolute) embodiment of values 
prevents cases of systematic akrasia to occur. So, 
prima facie, it seems that a person who is not fully 
epistemically virtuous could in certain circumstances 
always be overcome with a desire that p and conse-
quently be induced in believing that p; and there 
does not seem to be any obvious reason to suppose 
that this akratic self-deception cannot be systematic.  
We can avoid this potential problem by suppos-
ing that the embodiment of epistemic values should 
be taken in an absolute (non-degree) sense. How-
ever, in that case one could object that the solution 
of the selectivity problem in terms of embodiment of 
epistemic value loses its explanatory power. The 
idea is that one could admit that on the general level 
non-embodiment of epistemic values explains why 
self-deception occurs; usually people self-deceive 
because they are not epistemically virtuous. How-
ever, one could still argue that proper non-
embodiment of epistemic values does not explain 
Bermúdez’s original formulation of the selectivity 
problem, that is, why self-deception “occurred in 
that particular situation” (Bermúdez 2000, 317). 
Since most people do not exhibit stabile epistemic 
dispositions (they are not epistemically virtuous [see 
e.g. Samuels and Stich 2004]), the fact that they do 
not fully embody epistemic values would not have 
much explanatory power to explain why self-
deception occurred in some, but not in other particu-
lar cases. In this case, someone could say that the 
selectivity problem becomes acute again even for the 
account that introduces embodiment of epistemic 
values. At this point one might again argue that two 
persons can have the same desire that p, be at the 
same (non-perfect) level of epistemic value em-
bodiment, and have the same rejection/acceptance 
thresholds and still differ with regard to the exhibi-
tion of self-deception (one self-deceives, while the 
other does not). Consequently, that person might 
argue again that what is needed is the intention on 
the part of the agent in order to explain her exhibit-
ing self-deceiving belief. However, as I argued ear-
lier, I do not believe that this strategy actually works 
as a solution of the selectivity problem. 
The latter remarks about the value-based ac-
count are not meant to prove the falsity of the ac-
count; however, they do point out some of the gaps 
                                                                               
epistemic values in one context but not in the other, or 
does she overall embody them to a certain degree, etc.?  
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or misgivings of the account. Pedrini (2010, 135) 
also claims that her account is not a final word on 
the matter but that it provides a framework in which 
the selectivity problem could be solved. In section 5 
I will try to show why I find the selectivity problem 
dubious, and how the intuitions that support its 
genuineness can be explained away by using the 
framework of Pedrini’s value-based account.  
 
 
5. Dissolution of the selectivity problem 
At this moment one might start to despair that 
there is no solution of the selectivity problem, since 
the same problem can be raised even against inten-
tionalist accounts, and the other proposed account 
(value-based account) does not seem to be adequate. 
However, I believe that the discussion in section 3 
enables us to see the mootness of the selectivity 
problem as a genuine problem that sophisticated 
accounts (such as Mele’s 2001) of self-deception 
face. In section 3 I stated that, if genuine, the selec-
tivity problem can be directed towards intentionalist 
accounts15, because we can always raise the question 
of why in this particular situation a desire that p be 
the case (or to believe that p is the case) has caused 
one to acquire an intention to form a belief that p is 
the case.  
However, I believe that an intentionalist may 
properly solve the selectivity problem (as posed in 
section 3) simply by saying that that is just how the 
mechanism works, or at least how our folk-
psychological explanation, in simple cases, depicts 
the workings of the mechanism that produces inten-
tional action. In normal cases, we have a strong de-
sire that p and a belief that if I do q I will accomplish 
p, which causes us to decide to form an intention to 
make q true. Similarly in the case in which we adopt 
an intention to self-deceive that p is the case. I think 
that from a folk-psychological perspective the selec-
tivity problem puts too demanding a requirement on 
the adequacy of an action-explanation; if we take it 
as a genuine problem then it would be baffling how 
even in everyday cases an intention gets formed on 
the basis of the reasons that precede it. 
However, if we grant this answer to the inten-
tionalist then by parity of reasoning we have to grant 
it to the anti-intentionalist as well. The only differ-
ence will consist in the fact that the anti-
intentionalist will claim that it is not necessary to 
postulate an intention to acquire a belief in order to 
account for garden-variety cases of self-deception. 
                                                 
15
 At least against those accounts that have the form 
displayed in (Bermúdez 1997, 108). 
At this point the question that arises is why we 
feel the intuitive cogency of the selectivity problem 
as proposed by Bermúdez (1997, 2000)? The intui-
tive pull of the problem might be invited by Mele’s 
assertion that his conditions for self-deception are 
conceptually sufficient (see e.g. his [2012, 2]). This 
idea of conceptual sufficiency of Mele’s conditions 
should be read as giving a proto-analysis (ibid.) of 
the self-deception concept, and presumably its appli-
cation conditions. So, one might wonder and doubt 
whether it is really conceptually sufficient that when 
Mele’s conditions are satisfied then somehow by 
conceptual necessity it follows that we have a case 
of self-deception.  
However, it seems to me that, regardless of 
what is meant by conceptual sufficiency in this con-
text, when it comes down to explaining actual cases 
of self-deception the sufficiency of the thresholds for 
hypotheses acceptance and rejection (modified by 
the desire that something be the case) must include a 
ceteris paribus clause since psychological explana-
tion is a paradigmatic species of explanation that 
demands ceteris paribus laws (see e.g. Churchland 
1981, Davidson 2001, Fodor 1991), and if I under-
stand Mele (2001, 2012) correctly, in giving a defla-
tionary account of self-deception he intends it to be 
psychologically adequate. Hence, the question that 
now becomes pertinent is in what sense desire’s 
lowering the acceptance threshold of a particular 
hypothesis is not sufficient for self-deception? 
Logical sufficiency (in the sense that the thresh-
old for a hypothesis entails self-deceptive formation 
of a belief in that hypothesis) presumably cannot be 
adequate, since an empirical phenomenon does not 
presuppose logical necessity. Thus, just because we 
can imagine that a motivationally modified hypothe-
sis testing mechanism (that satisfies Mele’s other 
conditions) does not necessarily lead to self-
deception is not an argument against its empirical 
sufficiency. On the other hand, if we take it that the 
notion of sufficiency is causal then this notion of 
causality cannot simply involve nomic necessity 
since self-deception depends on contingencies of 
human nature (its less than perfect epistemic na-
ture).16 Thus we need to take into account the notion 
of ceteris paribus condition. But when we consider 
the selectivity problem in this light then the problem 
itself loses its weight. The question ‘why one self-
deceives in one situation and not in others’ (Ber-
                                                 
16
 For example, when Bermúdez states “[e]ven if one 
desires both that p be true and that one come to believe 
that p it is not inevitable that one will form the belief that 
p” (2000, 318, my emphasis)  it is possible that he has this 
strong reading of sufficiency in mind.  
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múdez 2000, 318) in a sense dissolves because the 
anti-intentionalist may argue that cases where self-
deception does not occur even though the accep-
tance/rejection thresholds are appropriately motiva-
tionally modified comprise cases in which cetera are 
not paria,17 that is those are cases in which normalcy 
conditions for the occurrence of self-deception do 
not obtain.18 
So, my claim is that from the perspective of a 
(folk) psychological explanation there is no problem 
for a sophisticated anti-intentionalist to explain why 
in certain situations a desire can be sufficient to in-
duce a self-deceiving belief and in others will not be 
sufficient. The dissolution of the selectivity problem, 
according to this view, consists in taking seriously 
into account the ceteris paribus conditions that psy-
chological explanations contain. Now, this invoking 
of ceteris paribus conditions might seem as a sort of 
magic bullet. In order to dispel these kinds of 
doubts, in the next section I will sketch a model of 
the conditions in which self-deception can be rea-
sonably expected to occur. 
 
5.1 Amending the value-based account of 
self-deception 
Earlier, in section 4, I argued that Pedrini’s 
(2010) value-based account could involve two no-
tions of epistemic virtue: epistemic virtue can be 
fully (absolutely) embodied or it can be embodied to 
a certain degree. On the one hand, the problem with 
the notion of full embodiment was that it was not 
very explanatory in the context of the selectivity 
problem since people are usually very far from em-
bodying epistemic virtues. On the other hand, the 
seeming problem with the graded notion of embod-
ied epistemic virtues was its inability to determine 
when a real cognitive agent is secured from self-
deception or will undergo a biased treatment of evi-
dence caused by a desire that something be the case, 
since ordinary cognitive agents regularly fall short of 
embodying epistemic virtue (usually to a varying 
degree). 
                                                 
17
 Despite the fact that Bermúdez claims the opposite. See 
(Bermúdez 2000, 317) where he claims that: “[…] 
possessing a desire that p be true is not sufficient to 
generate cognitive bias, even if all other things are equal 
[…].” 
18
 This also refutes Pedrini’s contention that desires are 
not sufficient to cause motivationally biased treatment of 
evidence that leads to self-deception (see Pedrini 2010, 
134). Since conditions in which desires become sufficient 
to cause biased treatment of evidence that lead to self-
deception exclude conditions in which an agent fully 
embodies epistemic virtues (i.e. cetera are not paria). 
However the above remark concerning the 
graded conception of epistemic value embodiment is 
only a problem if we think that desires are not suffi-
cient to bias one’s cognitive abilities, other things 
being equal. But if we take desires to be sufficient, 
other things being equal, then grades of distance of 
embodiment of epistemic value from the ideal can 
figure in the sufficiency clause as a part of the nor-
malcy condition that characterizes the background of 
desires’ (that cause self-deception) ceteris paribus 
clause.19  
Let me try to develop the latter thought a bit. As 
I interpret it, according to anti-intentionalists (of 
Mele’s deflationary kind) a desire that p be the case 
is sufficient, ceteris paribus, to bias one’s cognitive 
abilities and consequently to produce self-deceptive 
belief. Ceteris paribus condition involves the back-
ground conditions that constitute the normal circum-
stances in which desire causes self-deception. In our 
case, normal conditions that allow self-deception to 
occur, among other things, involve the condition that 
self-deceivers embody epistemic virtues to some 
degree. 
So, how can this vague idea of a degree of em-
bodiment of epistemic values play any explanatory 
role in this account? The answer I have in mind is 
provided in the following rough sketch: when rele-
vant conditions are satisfied and there is a strong 
desire that something be the case, then, normally 
people (who have that desire) self-deceive.20 That 
people normally self-deceive means that the statisti-
cal probability of self-deception is sufficiently high 
given the aforementioned conditions.21 So where do 
degrees of epistemic value embodiment enter the 
picture? They enter at the level of background nor-
mal circumstances; the supposition is that what de-
termines the statistical probability of forming the 
self-deceptive belief that p given the desire that p is 
the distance of the behavior of the actual epistemic 
agent from its corresponding ideal counterpart. 
                                                 
19
 Ceteris paribus clauses (and scientific laws that use 
them) are notoriously hard to adequately characterize. For 
a taxonomy of different senses of ceteris paribus 
sentences see Schurz (2002). However, it seems that 
recently a prima facie consensus (or a promising 
optimism) emerged that ceteris paribus clauses may be 
characterized by using so called normality accounts (see 
e.g. Reutlinger, Schurz and Hüttemann 2011).  
20
 Or more specifically people exhibit confirmation bias 
that leads them to self-deceive, but not to complicate 
things I will just write as if desire in normal situations 
lead directly to self-deception. 
21
 This is called the statistical probability consequence 
thesis. The thesis is somewhat controversial, but see 
Schurz (2001) for a forceful defense.  
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To make this idea more precise let us represent 
an actual cognitive agent and her corresponding 
ideally epistemically rational counterpart with func-
tions Ψ and Φ, respectively. Cognitive agents can be 
described as mappings between input world states 
(or states as perceived by the agent) and output men-
tal (belief) states, e.g. mapping Ψ takes evidence 
(world states) and outputs hypothesis (belief states) 
such that Ψ(ei)= h, where i is an index of some evi-
dence set. 
We can define a distance between the real and 
the ideal cognitive agent in the following way: let d 
be a distance function that takes Ψ and Φ as its ar-
guments. Also let ρ be a function from the set of 
cognitive agents to real numbers between zero and 
one such that ρi(Ψ)=1 if agent Ψ behaves in a fully 
epistemically rational way (fully embodies epistemic 
virtue) and ρi(Ψ)=0 if Ψ behaves in a completely 
irrational way from the epistemic perspective (does 
not embody epistemic virtue at all).22 In other words, 
the idea is that ρ gives a degree to which agents 
rationally treat/use/interpret evidence and 
form/evaluate hypotheses and it tries to capture the 
rationality of an agent’s behavior across different 
situations, where index i equals some natural num-
ber and signifies the difference in contexts in which 
a cognitive agent may exhibit (or not) its epistemic 
virtues. As a tentative and provisional formalization 
we can take the following equation to determine the 
distance function between the actual cognitive agent 
Ψ and its ideal counterpart Φ23:  
2
1
1( , ) ( ( ) ( ))
N
i i
i
d
N
=
Ψ Φ = ρ Φ −ρ Ψ!  
Since Φ fully embodies epistemic virtues ρi will 
always assign her 1, but ρi(Ψ), given that Ψ is a real, 
cognitively (and otherwise) limited, agent can take 
any value between zero and one. Hence, if we take 
only the extreme possible values, then across situa-
tions, if ρi(Ψ)=1 then d(Ψ,Φ) will equal zero. Which 
means that there is no difference between the actual 
agent and its epistemically rational counterpart in 
that particular situation; or we can say that Ψ fully 
embodies and manifests in a particular situation the 
epistemic virtue. If ρi(Ψ)=0 then d(Ψ,Φ) will equal 
one which would mean that Ψ is at a complete dis-
tance (according to this measure) from its ideal 
                                                 
22
 What determines the standards of epistemic rationality 
or epistemic virtue is a matter for epistemology and 
philosophy of science to discuss and settle. Here I will 
remain silent regarding the determination of standards of 
epistemic rationality. 
23
 One can immediately see that the equation is an 
instance of the Brier Score. 
counterpart and accordingly does not embody epis-
temic value.24 Thus in general, d(Ψ,Φ) will equal the 
average difference between the epistemic behavior 
of Ψ and Φ, across different situations in which 
cognitive agents might find themselves.  
Using the above formalization we can express 
the idea that the distance between the ideal epistemic 
agent and the real agent determines the statistical 
probability that the agent will be prone to epistemi-
cally irrational behavior, and the greater the distance 
between Ψ and Φ the more likely it is that the a de-
sire that p be the case will influenceΨ’s belief form-
ing processes. Hence, the appropriate values of the 
distance (d(Ψ,Φ)) measure constitute the back-
ground normal conditions that need to obtain in or-
der for the desire to be able to influence (cause) 
one’s self-deceiving belief formation. I wrote appro-
priate values of d since, if e.g. 0.09 " d(Ψ,Φ) " 0 
then presumably desire that p be the case will have 
negligible or no influence on the Ψ’s belief forming 
processes. However, since we suppose that self-
deception is a real phenomenon then there must be 
appropriate distance between Ψ and Φ (relative to 
some standards of rationality or virtues that an ide-
ally rational being embodies) which constitutes the 
background conditions that allow the phenomenon 
to occur given that the desire that something be the 
case is present (and suitably intense or strong), that 
is, that the statistical probability of self-deception 
(given that a certain desire occurs) is sufficiently 
high.25 So, the basic idea is that the greater the dis-
tance between the actual and ideal cognitive agent 
the more probable it will be that the actual cognitive 
agent self-deceives that p given her desire that p be 
the case. 
From the perspective of the ideas developed in 
this article Bermúdez’s (2000) claim that “possess-
ing a desire that p be true is not sufficient to generate 
cognitive bias, even if all other things are equal 
(…)” (p. 317) is not adequately supported. The dis-
solution of the selectivity problem, in the framework 
of folk-psychology, invokes the idea that the desire 
that p be the case causes motivational bias, ceteris 
paribus; where ceteris paribus conditions include an 
appropriate distance degree between the real cogni-
tive agent and her ideal counterpart or equivalently 
that there is a certain average difference between the 
                                                 
24
 Or we can say that she embodies the epistemic value to 
a degree 0. 
25
 And ideally d should be empirically measurable. One of 
the conditions for this depends on our being able to agree 
on which epistemic standards should be used as standards 
of evaluation of cognitive abilities and generally 
epistemic behavior of individual agent. 
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real and the ideal that constitutes the normal condi-
tions that allow or create circumstances in which a 
desire can cause biased treatment of evidence and 
consequently self-deceptive belief formation.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper my aim has been to discuss and 
examine the selectivity problem as proposed by 
Bermúdez (1997, 2000). Bermúdez presented the 
selectivity problem as a problem that counts against 
anti-intentionalist accounts of self-deception. Ber-
múdez also argued that intentionalists have a ready-
made solution to the selectivity problem and conse-
quently that this problem counts in favor of inten-
tionalists’ accounts of self-deception.  
I argued that the selectivity problem can be 
raised even against intentionalist accounts. Further-
more, I argued that the fact that a selectivity problem 
can be raised against intentionalist accounts indi-
cates the way in which the problem could be dis-
solved. The latter fact shows that the insistence on 
the cogency of the selectivity problem puts a too 
demanding requirement on what constitutes a sound 
(folk) psychological explanation. Therefore, in the 
final sections I set out to analyze the intuitions that 
gave a convincing tone to the selectivity problem 
and tried to accommodate them using resources that 
do not go beyond the commitments of a sophisti-
cated anti-intentionalist account. 
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